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- 2 -Preface 
Perhaps  the  greatest  economic  challenge  facing  the  Community  in the  last  years 
of  the  20th  centure  is  how  to  increase economic  and  social  cohesion.  With  the 
adhesion  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  the  Community  includes  most  Western  European 
countries  and  is the  biggest  exporter  and  importer  in  the  world,  with  an 
internal  market  comparable  to that  of the  U.S.  and  greater than  Japan's. 
The  Community's  potential  for  development  through  the  completion  of  the 
internal  market,  increased  coordination of  economic  policies,  and  further 
monetary  and  financial  integration is very  great.  However,  for  this potential 
to  be  realized the  Community  must  also overcome  serious  problems,  the  mai~ one 
being  the  tendency  for  their growing  to be  a  disparity between  the  more  and 
the  less developed  Member  States  and  regions.  Therefore  strengthening  the 
economic  and  social  cohesion  is the  principal  Community  objective for  the 
/' 
years  to  come. 
The  present  paper  attempts  to give  a  global  view  and  to clarify the  impact  of 
various  Community  policies on  economic  and  social  cohesion.  Further it 
suggests additional  measures  that  would  promote  economic  and  social  cohesion. 
It  is  hoped  that  the  present  paper  will  be  a  positive  contribution to  the 
discussion  of  this topic  and  to the  related questions  and  problems. 
Francis  ROY 
Director General  a.p. 
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- 5  -1.  Introduction 
The  present  study examines  the  impact  of  the  Community  on  growth  and 
inequality among  Member  States,  in order  to make  an  appraisal  of  the 
Community's  contribution to economic  and  social  cohesion  in  the past.  Past 
results will  help to  make  some  forecasts  about  the possible  contributions 
of  the  Community  in  future  and  also about  the  necessary options  the 
Community  faces  in  the  field  of  policy making. 
As  indicators  for  economic  and  social  cohesion,  the  study  takes  GOP  per 
head  in  the  Member  States.  It postulates that  an  increase of  GOP  per  head 
(i.e.  a  positive contribution  to  growth  by  the  Community)  is  a  positive 
element,  in that it also  increases  economic  and  social  cohesion.  Also,  a 
contribution of  the  Community  to the  Lessening  of  inequalities  among  the 
Member  States,  measured  by  a  comparison  of  GOP  per  head  between  the most 
and  the  less developed  Member  States,  would  be  a  positive  contribution to 
economic  and  social  cohesion.  On  the other  hand,  a  widening  of  inequality 
(of  the  gap  between  the  most  and  the  least  prosperous  Member  States)  would 
reduce  economic  and  social  cohesion  in  the  Community. 
2.  The  impact  of the  Community  on  welfare and  growth 
The  theory of  economic  integration  seeks  to answer  the question  "What  are 
the  expected  effects of  forming  a  customs  union  or  a  common  market?". 
According  to the  theory,  5  types  of  integration processes  can  be 
distinguished:  Free  Trade  Areas,  Customs  Unions,  Common  Markets,  Economic 
Unions  and  Unification.  The  EC,  as  it now  stands,  is  an  Economic  Union, 
characterized by  elimination of  customs  in the interior,  a  common  external 
tariff,  liberalization  (in part)  of  factor  of  production  movements  (labour 
and  capital)  and  some  harmonization of  national  economic  policies  (for 
example  in the  field  of  monetary  policy,  the  EMS,  and  in the  field of 
fiscal  policy the  VAT,  plus  regional,  social  and  research  policies>. 
- 6  -Most  empirical  studies undertaken to measure  the effects of  the  EC  use  the 
concepts  of  "welfare",  "trade creation"  and  "trade diversion".  Trade 
creation occurs  when  following  the  creation of  a  customs  union,  imports 
from  a  cheaper  source  replace  more  expensive  imports.  Trade  diversion 
occurs  if more  expensive  production or  imports  replace  cheaper  imports 
after the  creation of  the  customs  union.  This  can  occur  if imports  from  a 
member  of  the  union  become  cheaper  because  they are  no  longer  subject to a 
duty;  while  the  imports  from  a  third country  become  more  expensive  on  the 
home  market,  because  they  will  be  subject  to a  common  external tariff. 
Thus,  answering  the question of  the desirability of  forming  a  customs  union 
and  a  common  market  becomes  an  empirical  matter.  Customs  union  theory 
cannot  give  an  ex-ante answer.  There  are, at the moment,  more  than  25 
estimates  regarding  the global  effect of  the  EC  in terms  of  trade 
creation/diversion1•  The  main  findings  are:  a)  Trade  creation exceeded 
trade diversion;  b)  No  precise order of  magnitude  can  be  established since 
within  the  same  year,  depending  on  the methodology  and  the assumptions 
made,  one  result  can  be  four  times  larger than  the other;  c)  There  is a 
tendency  for  the effects to be  greater if a  longer  time  horizon  is 
considered.  So,  in spite of  a  step-by-step process of tariff dismantling 
and  of possible bias  due  to inflation and  methodologies  used,  integration 
has  had  positive effects  in  the  case of  the  Community. 
The  assumptions2 necessary  for  the  estimations of  welfare effects are very 
restrictive,  being  the  assumptions  of  general  equilibrium economics. 
General  equilib~ium economics  is criticised for  having  very  little 
resemblance  to the  real  world  economy,  and  its assumptions,  even  if taken 
as  heuristic  functions,  are  considered by  some  authors  to be  totally 
irrelevant.  The  most  constraining of these assumptions  is the static 
nature of  the  theory  (the  integration process  is dynamic>,  the  immobility 
of  factors  (in the  EC  the  factors  are  mobile)  and  the  automatic  adjustment 
in the  balance  of  payments3 
As  mentioned  above,  the  ultimate yardstick  by  which  to decide  upon  the 
interest  of  forming  or  joining an  economic  union  would  be  the  impact  on 
real  per  capita  income.  But  the  impact  mainly  depends,  not  on  the static 
effects that  customs  union  theory  takes account  of,  but  on  dynamic  effects; 
- 7  -These  are:  (a)  Induced  investment;  (b)  Efficiency;  (c)  Specialisation 
which  results  in structural  changes  in the economy;  (d)  Terms  of  trade 
effects;  (e)  Balance  of  payments  effects. 
Some  authors4,  estimating _that  integration effects are  mainly  derived  from 
trade use  the  foreign  trade multiplier for  measurement  of  the  integration 
effects, with  export  growth  as  the major  component  of  autonomous  demand. 
This  framework,  instead of  the  trade  creation/diversion and  welfare 
effects,  uses  total trade effects to estimate  changes  in output  which  are 
both  simpler  and  more  accurate.  It takes  into account  the  import  side 
through  changes  in the  income  elasticity of  demand  from  imports. 
The  estimates  of  one  study5  using  this method  are that  in the  period 
1961-1972  the  Community  (and  integration)  contributed by  more  than  2%  to 
the  rate of  growth  of  GDP.  These  are  values  much  higher  than  those 
estimated  by  the  welfare-customs  union  method.  For  the  most  favoured 
countries  <Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Luxembourg)  integration during this 
period accounted  for  about  55%  of the  actual  growth  rates experienced  by 
these  economies.  The  effects of  integration  continue  also during  the 
second  period  examined  in  the  study,  1974-1981. 
Denmark,  one  of  the  new  members,  is the  only  EC  country  that  has  apparently 
Lost  from  integration mainly  because  it did  not  have  a  significant  amount 
of  trade  creation,  which  even  showed  a  declining trend,  as  can  be  seen  from 
Table  2.  France,  in  contrast  to the  period 1961-1972,  <see  Table  1)  was 
the  country  which  fared  best  in both  absolute  and  relative terms,  with  over 
half its actual  growth  rate accounted  for  by  integration effects. 
Comparing  the  performance  of  the  new  members  with  that  of  the  former 
members,  the  new  benefited  least  in  absolute  terms  relatively to all the 
older members,  although  in  relation to the actual  growth  rate the  UK 
apparently experienced  a  larger benefit  than  the  Netherlands  and  Italy. 
This  performance  deserves  particular mention,  since  large  sectors of  public 
opinion  in  the  UK  believe that  integration has  worsened  the  rate of  growth 
through  adverse  balance  of  payments  effects.  In  spite of  adverse  effects 
of  the  CAP,  the  results  show  that  integration accounts  for  about  30%  of 
growth  during  this period. 
- 8  -It  can  be  argued  that  new  members  adhering  to the  Community  need  a  certain 
period of  time  for  their economies  to adapt  to the  new  situation,  before 
they  reap  the full  benefits of  the  integration process.  This  could  explain 
why  some  of  the  old  Member  States,  for  example  France,  experience  a 
negative effect  in  the  first  period and  a  positive one  in  the  second  one, 
and  why  in  the  period  1974-1981  old  Member  States  seem  to  have  benefited on 
the  whole  more  than  the  new  ones. 
The  study  concludes  that:  " ••• for  the  past  quarter of  a  century,  the  EEC 
integration scheme  has  played  a  major  role  in the economic  growth  achieved 
by  Europe.  If the estimates  are  accepted  we  can  say  that  in 1972  the  GDP 
of  the  EEC  was  2.2%  higher  than  it would  have  been  without  integration and 
after enlargement,  the  EEC  ended  up  in  1981  with  a  GOP  that  was  5.9%  higher 
than  in the non-integration  situation"6• 
The  methodology  of  the  above  mentioned  study  is a  big  improvement  on 
customs  union  studies,  mentioned  in the  beginning  of this part.  Still, it 
does  not  cover  completely all dynamic  effects  like efficiency gains.  If, 
for  example,  market  integration  leads,  through  increased  competition,  to 
improved  firm  efficiency  <and  to more  firms  of  near  optimum  firm  size  in 
all  Member  States)  trade  flows  could  remain  more  or  less  unchanged,  but 
overall  productivity would  increase  substantially,  and  thus  also the growth 
rate.  In  this  case  there  is a  shift  in  the  production  function  that  is not 
captured  by  trade  flows,  because  it does  not  affect  intra-EEC 
competitiveness  <since  many  EC  firms  in different  Member  States experienced 
it).  So  the  above  mentioned  results of  the  influence of  the  EC  on  growth 
rates  may  still be  an  underestimate.  But  it can  safely be  concluded  that 
the  EC  has  contributed positively to growth  and  therefore to economic  and 
social  cohesion. 
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1  Old  production  function,  before efficiency gains  due  to  integration. 
2  At  point  L2  firms  reach  optimum  size and  thus there are efficiency 
gains  (due  for  example  to economies  of  scale).  There  is a  shift to the 
higher  production  function. 
The  shift  in  the  production  function  could  also be  brought  about  by  the 
implementation  of  common,  pre-competitive  research.  Spillover effects of 
such  research  are  shared  by  all firms  and  so  do  not  change  their 
competitive position  inside the  Community  (but  do  increase their 
extra-Community  competitiveness)  and  so  are  not  reflected  in  changed 
intra-EC  trade  flows. 
3.  The  impact  of the Community  on  inequality 
While  econometric  estimates  are  almost  unanimous  that  the  EC  has 
contributed positively to welfare  and  growth,  the existing  Literature is 
far  from  conclusive  on  the question of  inequality,  some  studies suggesting 
an  increase  in  inequality, others  a  reduction  and  some  being  inconclusive. 
The  reasons  for  such  disparate  predictions derive both  from  the  inherent 
difficulty of  the  questions  and  from  deficiencies and/or  inadequacies of 
the  methodologies  used.  In  a  non-exhaustive  enumeration  of these one  can 
mention  the  absence  of  a  precise definition of  what  is meant  by  divergence; 
the difficult  choice  of  an  appropriate  inequality measure;  the use  of only 
a  few  point  estimates to deduce  trends;  the  non-compatibility of data  bases 
and  the  absence  of  a  control  group  of  countries with  which  comparisons  can 
be  made. 
- 10  -In  the  present  study  the  "income  per  head  gap"  is used  as  an  indicator to 
measure  inequality.  "Income  per  head  gap"  A 1  is defined  as  the difference 
in  percentage of the  incomes  per  head  of  two  countries: 
Table  A 
!Year  I  G1  A1  G2  A2  G3  A3  G4  A4  Gs  As 
I 
I 
11960  I 44.51  53.51  56.71  43.31  48.01  52.01  32.41  67.61  21.21  78.81 
11973  I 50.01  50.01  49.31  50.71  37.71  62.31  31.61  68.41  22.41  77.61 
11981  I  59.91  40.11  56.01  44.01  47.51  52.51  34.01  66.01  21.51  78.51 
11987* I 65.21  34.81  57.01  43.01  46.91  53.11  23.01  77.01  17.31  82.71 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
G1  = Italy/Luxembourg 
G2  = Italy/Denmark 
G3  = Ireland/Denmark 
G  =  4  Greece/Denmark 
G5  = Portugal/Denmark 
G 1  :  GNP  per  head  of  an  Italian as  a  percentage of  GNP  per  head  of  a 
Luxemburger  etc. 
The  gap  is then  the difference of  GOP's  per  head,  i.e.  A 1 =  100- G 1 
etc 
1987  numbers  are  estimates 
Source:  Data  of  table  3. 
According  to the first  ratio,  A 1,  the  GOP  per  head  gap  of  Italy and 
Luxembourg  <at  the  time  the poorest  and  richest  Member  States of the 
Community)  was  53.5%,  or an  Italian's income  was  44.5%  of  a  Luxemburger's 
income. 
The  gap  kept  diminishing  to  reach  34.8%  in  1987,  when  an  Italian's income 
reached  65.2%  of  a  Luxemburger's. 
- 11  -Observing  G2,  Italy with  Denmark  (which  became  a  Member  of  the  EC  in  1973 
and  was  at  the  same  year  the  richest  EC  Member  State)  the  gap  increased 
from  1960  to 1973  <A2  in  1960:  43.3%,  A 2  in  1973:  50.7%)  and  then 
diminished till 1987,  when  Italy's  GDP  per  head  reached  57%  of  Denmark's 
(as  against  56.7%  in  1960).  Still, taking  the  whole  period  1960-1987,  the 
gap  remained  more  or  Less  constant,  being  in  1987  smaller  by  just  0.3% 
Observing  G 3  (Ireland and  Denmark)  which  were  respectively the  poorest  and 
the  richest  Member  State at  the  time  of  their adhesion  to the  EC  in  1973, 
the  gap  increased  during  the  non-adhesion  period  (1960-1973)  from  52%  to 
62.3%  (i.e.  Ireland's  income  was  48%  of  Denmark's  in  1960  and  only  37.7%  in 
1973).  Since  then  the  ratio fluctuated  but  has  not  yet  reached  the  1960 
Level.  In  1987  Ireland's  GDP  per  head  is  46.9%  of  Denmark's,  still below 
the  48%  of  1960,  but  above  the  37.7%  of  1973. 
Observing  G 4  (Greece-Denmark),  which  were  the  poorest  and  richest  Member  at 
the  time  of Greece's  adhesion  in  1981)  the  gap  decreased  from  67.6%  in  1960 
to  66%  in  1981,  and  then  increased  again  dramatically  to  77%  by  1987,  i.e. 
Greece's  GDP  per  head  which  represented  32.4%  of  Denmark's  in  1960  was  34% 
of it in  1981  but  only  23%  by  1987. 
Observing  G5  (Portugal/Denmark)  as  a  control  variable  for  a  country  which 
was  not  a  Member  State till 1986  with  one  which  was,  the  gap  remained 
fairly stable till 1981  (from  78.8  in  1960  to 78.5  in  1981)  but  then 
increased  to 82.7  by  1987.  This  development  is  analogous  to that  of  G 4, 
although  Portugal  was  not  a  Member  of  the  EC  till 1986,  while  Greece  was 
from  1981. 
There  is no  clear  cut  result  arising out  of  Table  A.  In  some  cases, 
differences  and  inequality  have  diminished  <Italy)  and  in others  they  have 
have  remained  about  the  same  (Ireland)  while  in others  they  have  increased 
(Greece).  One  criticism of  the  use  of  GDP  per  head  at  current  prices,  is 
that  the  strong  influence of  exchange  rate movements  greatly affects  the 
results.  Thus,  these  results  may  be  biased.  Actually,  the  exchange  rate 
of  the  Lira during  most  of  the  period,  as  well  as  the  exchange  rate of  the 
Irish pound,  the  Greek  Drachma  and  the  Portuguese  Escudo  were  being 
devalued  against  the  Luxembourg/Belgium  Franc  and  the  Danish  Kroner. 
- 12  -Table  B gives  the  GOP  per  heads  ratios using  purchasing  power  parities 
(PPP). 
Table  B 
IYearl  P1  81  P2  82  P3  83  P4  84  Ps  Bs  P6  86 
I  I 
I  I 
11960152.3147.71  124.5175.51 
119701  -- I -- I74.7I25.3IS3.0I47.0I42.4I57.6I35.3I64.7I  -- I -- I 
I1973I62.0I3B.OI74.4I25.6IS3.4I46.6I47.5I52.5I41.3I58.7I39.4I6D.61 
l1981l76.4l23.6l81.2l18.8l62.1 137.9150.9149.1 l43.5l56.5l47.9l51.1l 
I1984I69.8I3D.2I74.9I25.1IS8.2I41.8I46.9l53.1l  I  143.8164.21 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
p1  =  Italy/Luxembourg 
p2  =  Italy/Denmark 
p3  =  Ireland/Denmark 
p4  = Greece/Denmark 
Ps  = Portugal/Denmark 
p  =  6  Greece/Luxembourg 
The  gap  is defined as  in  table  A. 
PPP  statistics not  yet  available after 1984. 
Source:  Data  of  Table  4. 
Observing  81  (Italy having  the  lowest  and  Luxembourg  the  highest  GOP  per 
head  according  to  PPP),  the  gap  shows  a  steady diminishing  from  1960.to 
1981  and  then  increases  again  by  1984.  The  same  is true also  for  82• 
Observing  e3,  <Ireland  having  the  lowest  GOP  per  head  after enlargement  in 
1973)  the  gap  diminishes  up  to  1981  and  starts to  widen  again after 1981. 
The  same  applies  also to e4  and  e6  (Greece/Luxembourg,  Luxembourg  remaining 
throughout  the  period  the  Member  State  with  the  highest  GOP  per  head 
\ 
according  to  PPP.  Denmark  has  the  highest  GDP  per  head  after 1973,  using 
current  prices  and  exchange  rates.  Greece  was  the  country  with  the  lowest 
GDP  per  head  after the  second  enlargment  in  1981  and  before  the third of 
1986). 
- 13  -What  is striking when  using  PPP  is that  there  is a  steady  converging  of 
GOP's  per  head  and  a  parallel  reduction of  inequality  up  to  1981  both  for 
Member  States  and  for  non  Member  States  (Greece  and  Portugal).  On  the 
other  hand,  after  1981  there  is a  consistent  widening  of  the  gap  and 
increasing  inequality  shown  by  all  ratios.  Unfortunately  no  PPP  is 
available  for  1984  for  Portugal,  so  that  there  is no  control  ratio.  Still, 
the  result  is clear:  Up  to  1981  integration  was  related to  convergence  and 
diminishing  inequality,  while  in  the  period  1981-83  divergence  and 
inequality  increased. 
The  Community  failed  to bring about  more  equality and  convergence  during 
the  period  1981-1984.  This  of  course  does  not  yet  mean  that  the  widening 
of  the gap  was  due  to the  Community,  because  non-participating countries 
may  have  also  shown  similar developments.  But  the  fact  is that  the  EC 
policies  were  not  sufficient  to  counterbalance  these diverging  economic 
trends  and  to  bring  about  increased  convergence  after 1981. 
We  conclude  that  economic  policies  followed  by  the  Member  States were  more 
important  for  the  development  of  convergence/divergence·than  the 
implementation  of  Community  policies.  The  influence of most  of these 
policies,  (regional  and  social  policy mainly)  were  positive but 
insignificant  in their  impact,  while  the  influence of  CAP  was  negative  and 
significant.  This  may  have  been  a  source  of  inequality that  can  be 
directly attributed to the  EC. 
The  basic  aims  of  the  Community,  in order  to  increase economic  and  social 
cohesion,  are  the  modernisation  and  adaptation of  the  economic  structure of 
the  less developed  Member  States.  This  modernisation  includes  the  support 
and  reinforcement  of existing structures  and  their adaptation to  increased 
competition,  as  well  as  the  creation of  new  productive  capacity  in 
technologically  more  advanced  fields.  This  effort  cannot  be  based  solely 
on  national  resources  and  policies,  although  both  play  a  very  important 
role.  On  the other  hand,  capital  insufficiency always  characterised the 
less  developed  Community  economies,  while  national  policies are  constrained 
more  and  more  by  Community  policies  and  international  interdependence. 
Thus,  enhancing  the  economic  and  social  cohesion  of the  Community 
- 14  -presupposes  an  important  Community  contribution to its  less  developed 
Members  and  an  adaptation of  Community  policies towards  the  aims  of 
increasing  growth'and  reducing  inequality. 
In  the  following  sections  the  impact  of  the  Community  policies are 
examined. 
4.  The  Single Act,  Convergence  and  Cohesion 
The  Single  Act  sets  new  objectives  for  the  Community,  including the 
completion  of  the  internal  market  and  the  achievement  of economic  and 
social  cohesion,  which  will  reduce  inequality.  Completion  of  the  internal 
market  is vital  for  growth,  while  greater  cohesion  is a  political  and 
economic  necessity  following  enlargements. 
Still, when  trying to  realise  the  two  objectives of  growth  and  the 
reduction  of  inequality,  some  basic  questions  have  to  be  asked.  The 
realisation of  the  internal  market,  allowing  increased mobility of  factors 
of  production  <Labour  and  capital)  resources  and  goods,  will  promote 
growth.  What  is not  so  clear  is if it will  reduce  inequality, or  if it 
will  increase it.  The  reduction  and  elimination  of  internal barriers  could 
result  in  an  outflow of  factors  of  production  and  resources  from  the poorer 
to  the  richer  regions  within  the  Community,  Or,  on  the  contrary,  the 
reduction  and  elimination of  internal  barriers  could  bring  resources  to 
less  developed  regions.  Unfortunately,  both  economic  theory  and  experience 
do  not  provide  unequivocal  answers  to the  three basic  questions: 
(1)  Is  there  a  trade-off  between  growth  and  inequality? 
(2)  Do  we  have  to pay  for  higher  growth  with  increased  inequality? 
(3)  Do  we  reduce  growth,  when  trying  to  reduce  inequality? 
Lacking  a  clear-cut  economic  answer  to the  above  questions,  the  Community 
and  before it and  parallel  to it, the  Member  States  come  up  with  a  second 
best  solution,  based  on  social  and  political criteria.  Inequality must  be 
reduced  through  redistribution of  resources,  even  if it has  some  negative 
effects on  growth,  because  for  social  and  political  reasons  an  increase of 
inequality  in  the  Community  is unacceptable.  Still,  redistribution  through 
- 15  -the structural  funds  must  not  become  the main  objective,  the main  objective 
remaining  measures  that  enhance  growth,  like better economic  policies and 
their coordination,  common  research etc. 
The  Single  Act  instructs  the  Commission  to  submit  to the  Council  a 
"comprehensive  proposal •••  the  purpose  of  which  will  be  to make  such 
amendments  to the  structure and  operational  rules  of  the existing 
structural  Funds •••  as  are  necessary  to clarify and  rationalize their tasks 
in order  to  contribute to the  achievement  of  the objectives,  to  increase 
their efficiency and  to  coordinate their activities between  themselves  and 
the operations of  the  existing financial  instruments"  (130  D). 
Five  priority objectives  have  been  identified for  the  Structural  Funds: 
<1>  Helping  backward  areas  to  catch-up 
(2)  Restructuring  regions  in decline 
(3)  Combating  long-term  unemployment 
(4)  Integrating young  people  into the  working  environment 
(5)  Developing  rural  areas,  notably  but  not  exclusively through  the 
adjustment  of agricultural  structures. 
These  objectives  should  be  achieved,  according  to the  Commission7,  through 
two  key  principles: 
(1)  Preference  will  be  given  to multiannual  programmes  designed  to 
complement  action  by  the  Member  States and  the  regions  themselves. 
(2)  Management  will  be  decentralised as  far  as  possible.  Brussels  must  not 
become  yet  another  centralising force  but  rather  a  base  for  generating 
and  disseminating  initiatives. 
This  is the  background  to the  Commission's  proposal  to double  the  volume  of 
the  Structural  Funds  in  real  terms  between  now  and  1993.  It must  be  noted 
that  actually the  resources  of  the  Structural  Funds  correspond  to  0.2%  of 
the  Community's  GOP. 
The  following  problems  exist  in  relation to  the working  of  the  structural 
funds  and  should  be  taken  into account  during  the  implementation  of  the 
"new"  stru~tural funds: 
- 16  -(1)  The  consistency  and  complementarity  of  national  action and  Community 
support 
(2)  The  visible utility of  Community  support 
(3)  The  adequacy  of  financial  resources to secure  a  marked  reduction  in 
macro-economic  terms  of  regional  imbalances  in  the  Community. 
Action  taken  by  the  Community  should  be  concentrated  in  those  fields  where 
it offers extra  advantages  in  relation to national  measures.  The  three 
cases  specified  in the  so-called Varfis  memorandum  are  those  in which  the 
integration of  certain Member  States  is  being  hampered  by  a  Lack  of 
national  financial  resources  or  by  the  weakness  of  the technical  and 
administrative  infrastructure;  where  the  dissemination  of  successful 
examples  can  offer a  synergy  between  national  measures  and  where  it 
provides  a  clear political  signal  of  the  Community's  support  for  weaker 
regions. 
The  Commission  has  also  stated  in its recent  memorandum  on  the  reform  of 
the  structural  funds  that  "through  its structural  funds  and  its financial 
instruments,  the  Community  must  help to generate  an  above-average  rate of 
productivity growth  in  its  less-favoured  regions  and  must  create there, 
through  the  financial  assistance it provides,  the  conditions necessary  for 
the  mobilisation  and  for  a  spontaneous  flow  of  capital."  This  increase  in 
productivity  growth  is necessary  to ensure  a  firm  basis  for  economic 
expansion  and  to  avoid  excessive  inflationary pressures. 
It  would  appear  then that  the  Commission  sees  the  process  of  convergence  as 
arising  from  a  more  rapid  rate of  investment  in  less-favoured  regions.  In 
promoting  economic  development  in the  regions,  the  role of  public 
authorities  in general,  and  of  the  Community  in  particular,  is to 
facilitate  private  investment  flows,  to  promote  vocational  training and  to 
encourage  the  "exploitation of  indigenous  potential." 
The  major  difficulty with  the  approach  to  convergence  adopted  by  the 
Commission  Lies  firstly  in  the  uncertainty attached to the  policy of 
promoting  regional  development  by  spending  more  public  money  on  current 
schemes,  in particular programmes  to  improve  infrastructure and  attract 
mobile  investment.  Existing  studies of  the effectiveness of  regional 
policy  measures  produce  different  conclusions.  Although  regional 
- 17  -disparities within  Member  States  with  a  long  tradition of  regional  policy 
have  frequently  not  been  narrowed,  they  might  well  have  got  worse  in the 
absence  of  the national  policies  concerned.  The  precise  impact  of 
different  types  of  regional  incentive  has  not  however  been  satisfactorily 
resolved.  The  Community  has  emphasised  infrastructure  spending  under  the 
ERDF  and  vocational  training  under  the  Social  Fund:  although  in  both  cases 
these activities probably  contribute to the growth  of  less-favoured  regions 
and  to  convergence,  it is not  evident  that  the  Community's  money  is best 
spent  on  building bridges  and  training technicians  (assuming  that  the 
Community  is  in  fact  contributing to a  net  increase  in  these activities and 
that  the  fears  in  regard  to absence  of  "additionality" are  unjustified>. 
Other  types  of  policy  with  a  regional  impact  may  be  more  valuable  in 
future,  particularly if the total  resources  of  the structural  funds  are 
increased. 
A rise  in  economic  activity  in  the  less-favoured  regions  is correctly seen 
in  the  Commission  proposals  as  dependent  on  a  rise  in  investment.  Most  of 
this  investment  must  come  from  private  sources  and  a  rise  in private 
investment  is more  closely  linked  to government  macroeconomic  policies  and 
to trends  in the  world  economy  than  to  improvements  in public 
infrastructure and  the  supply  of  technicians.  It  is also  strongly 
associated  with  the  entrepreneurial  attitudes and  management  capabilities 
of  the  people  in the  regions  concerned. 
Thus,  while  a  major  increase  in the  Community's  structural  funds  is 
certainly desirable  and  probably essential  for  political  reasons,  the  use 
that  is made  of  these  funds  needs  to be  more  closely  linked to the  real 
prospects  of  achieving a  more  rapid  rate of  private  investment  in the 
Community's  Less-favoured  regions.  While  further  improvements  in 
infrastructure are  necessary,  examination  needs  to be  given  to the 
possibility of: 
a)  direct  transfers  to the  government  concerned  to  compensate  for 
inadequate  national  fiscal  capacity,  but  linked to  improvements  in 
administration  and  education  in  less-favoured  regions; 
- 18  -b)  stronger  support  for  small  and  medium  sized enterprises  in both 
industrial  and  rural  less-favoured  regions,  in particular for  management 
training and  for  commercial  research  projects; 
c)  transfers to the  natinal  budgets  of  weaker  Member  States to provide 
enhanced  social  security arrangements  or  possibly to  compensate  for 
reduced  contributions  by  employers  and  employees  in  the  least-favoured 
regions. 
It  may  well  be  argued  that  financial  transfers to the  governments  of  the 
weaker  Member  States should  not  be  carried out  by  means  of  the  structural 
funds.  If this were  accepted,  however,  consideration would  have  to be 
given  to an  increase  in the  ERDF  and  Social  Fund  and  to the  creation of 
other budget  lines.  In  any  case,  it is evident  that  the total  resources 
available  from  the  Community  budget  for  these  purposes  may  not  in 
themselves  be  sufficient  to bring about  convergence.  As  stated above, 
macroeconomic  policies  are  likely to be  more  important.  The  granting of 
more  resources  from  the  Community  budget  to the development  of 
less-favoured  regions  could  be  made  contingent  on  the  adoption  by  the 
governments  of  the  Member  States  concerned  of  macroeconomic  policies that 
will  favour  both  an  increase  in  investment  and  in  cross-border  financial 
flows  which  will  strengthen  the  cohesion  aand  integration of  the  Community. 
5.  The  Co..on Agricultural  Policy 
Econometric  estimates  arrived at  both  with  the  trade  creation/diversion and 
other  methodologies8  support  the  widespread  claim that  the  CAP  was 
responsible  as  a  source  of  economic  inefficiency.  The  CAP  has  been 
responsible  for  an  increase  in  inequality between  Member  States,  in spite 
of  favouring  one  of  the  poorest,  Ireland.  According  to one  estimate9  the 
cumulative  Loss  was  around  1.7%  of  the  Community's  GDP  by  1981. 
Higher  EC  than  world  market  prices  meant  surpluses  and  inefficiency  in the 
Community  while  increased  support  for  northern  as  against  mediterranean 
products  meant  a  net  transfer of  resources  from  the  mediterranean  countries 
(but  also the  UK)  to the  richer  northern  countries,  increasing thus 
inequality.  It must  be  said,  however,  that  agricultural  surpluses  are  not 
- 19  -a  phenomenon  unique  to the  EC,  but  a  problem  faced  by  the  agricultural 
sectors of all industrialised countries.  All  these  countries  support  their 
agricultural  sector on  a  massive  scale.  For  this  reason,  GATT  negotiations 
should  lead  to a  reduction of  subventions,  but  such  a  reduction  would  make 
no  sense  if it were  not  followed  by  the  totality of  industrialised 
countries. 
If the  EC  cannot  manage  to give  market  prices  a  greater  role  in the 
interplay of  supply  and  demand,  the  CAP  will  sink  even  deeper  into a  morass 
of  administrative measures  and  rules  for  the  quantitative  regulation of 
production.  This  will  provoke  resistance  from  consumers  and  the 
development  of  substitute products,  and  will  in  addition  cut  off 
agriculture  from  the potential  for  developing  industrial  and  food  outlets 
through  exports. 
The  Community  must  continue  to try to bring  intervention back  to its 
original  role of  short-term market  adj~stment.  Intervention must  no 
Longer  be  seen  as  an  artificial supplement  to the  market,  automatic  and 
permanent,  ironing out  all market  effects and  preventing  any  action to 
bring  supply  on  line with  demand. 
The  Commission  has  indicated the  approach  it intends to adopt  in  seeking 
better balance  on  agricultural  markets.  This  involves  a  restrictive 
pricing policy,  more  flexibility on  guarantees  and  intervention mechanisms 
and  a  higher  degree  of  producer  co-responsibility,  including  recourse  to 
quota  systems. 
It  also  intends  to  continue  adjusting  intervention mechanisms  for  the 
products  where  the  major  problems  arise, especially by  limiting buying-in 
to  certain periods of  the  year,  and  by  reinforcing  measures  to guide 
production  towards  those  qualities  which  the  market  requires.  The  general 
aim  is that  farmers  should  gradually  be  induced  to take greater 
responsibility for  their  choices  of  types  of  product  and  for  finding 
unsubsidised outlets.10 
Together,  the  reforms  introduced  since  1984  and  the  1987  price package 
represent  an  annual  budgetary  saving of  some  6,000 million  ECU  in  constant 
prices. 
- 20  -The  changes  required  in the  CAP  will  be  brought  to bear  on  an  agricultural 
situation which,  in  a  Community  of  12,  is extremely diverse.  There  are 
great  differences  in natural  and  structural  conditions  of  production  and  in 
the  impact  of  agriculture on  socio-economic  balances  and  on  the 
environment.  The  measures  taken  will  bite more  in the  case  of  those  farms 
which  are  economically  and  structurally weaker  The  action  the  Community 
is to take must  allow  for  these  facts  and  at  the  same  time  it must  also 
avoid  any  tendency  to sideslip into national  or  Community  measures  that  may 
lead  to unfair distortion of  competition  within  a  single market.  That  is 
why  the  Commission's  proposals  include differentiated measures  to take 
account  of  the  special  situations of  some  farmers  or  some  regions.  But 
such  differentiation  cannot  go  beyond  the  limits  imposed  by  a  policy of 
improving  the  allocation of  resources  in the  light  of  the  comparative 
advantages  enjoyed  by  each  country  and  region.  In  order  to achieve 
greater  balance  between  the  imperatives of  the market  and  the need  to 
reinforce  economic  and  social  cohesion,  the  Single  Act  provides  for  a 
revision of  the  Community's  structural  funds.  This  concerns  the 
agricultural  sector to a  great  extent, especially  when  one  considers  that 
for  a  great  number  of  underdeveloped  regions agriculture is the main 
economic  activity. 
In  order  to absorb  the  negative effects of  CAP  reform,  the  Commission 
proposed  direct  income  aids,  as  well  as  prepension  systems.  These 
instruments  are  not  an  attempt  to move  away  from  an  economic  approach  to 
agricultural policy,  but  represent  the  development  of  measures  that  would 
permit  the  transition to an  agricultural sector with  Less  employment. 
Still, some  further  problems  must  be  solved.  In  the  part  Guarantee,  the 
CAP  is based  on  common  criteria.  On  the other  hand,  the  criteria used  in 
the  part  Orientation of  the  CAP,  are  national.  Thus,  under  the  present 
system,  the  inequality between  the  Community's  regions  is not  diminished, 
since  regions  that  are  considered  to be  less developed  in  a  'rich'  Member 
State would  be  characterised as  dynamic  if they  are  part  of  a  'poor'  Member 
State.  This  is  why  it is necessary to  introduce  common  criteria  in order 
to establish  in  future  which  regions  of  the  Community  will  be  considered as 
less  developed  for  the  purposes  of  the  Orientation part  of  the  FEOGA. 
- 21  -Intervention of  the  FEOGA-Orientation  should  have  the  following  aims  -
<1>  The  reinforcing of  farmer's  income  that  will  be  hit  the  hardest  by  the 
restructuring of  the  CAP,  in  particular  in  the  Less-developed  regions 
of  the  Community, 
<2>  The  possibility of  developing  in agricultural  areas  of activities 
complementary  to agriculture,  as  tourism  and  some  forms  of  handcrafts, 
in order  to  develop  the  endogenous  potential of  regions  affected by  the 
PAC's  revision. 
(3)  The  guarantee  and  conservation of  social  and  economic  characteristics 
of  mountainous  and  Less-developped  regions  of  the  Community,  also as  a 
part  of  environment  policy, 
(4)  The  development  of  new  methods  of  agricultural  production  through  the 
implementation  of  applied agricultural  research  programmes. 
For  the  success  of  the  above  aims,  a  substantial  increase of  the 
Orientation part's  resources  is necessary.  An  increase  to  25%  (out  of  5% 
today)  of  the  Community's  budget  would  be  appropriate.  This  increase of 
the  Orientation part  would  have  to  be  matched  by  a  more  than  equivalent 
reduction  of  the Guarantee's  part  expenses,  so  that  CAP  expenses  reach  in 
future  a  Lower  percentage  of  the  Community's  budget.  This  would  free 
resources  for other  much  needed  Community  policies. 
The  resources  of  the  Orientation part  of  FEOGA  should  be  used: 
(1)  For  the amelioration of  infrastructure of  predominantly agricultural 
areas, 
(2)  To  finance  research  in agriculture, 
(3)  To  set  up  information  services  as  to agricultural  markets  and  prospects 
that  would  be  accessible to  farmers  (so  as  to enable  them  to  reorient 
their production  according  to  Community  total demand  and  the world 
situation), 
(4)  To  train  farmers  so  that  they  can  use  better farming  methods  and 
restructure,  when  necessary,  their production, 
(5)  To  support  the  introduction of  modern  management  methods  in 
agricultural  enterprises. 
- 22  -6.  Regional  Policy 
As  seen  above  (Tables  A and  B)  the  Community  did  not  reduce  inequality 
among  its Member  States  and  the  consequent  enlargements  with 
Less-developped  countries,  Like  Ireland  (1973),  Greece  (1981)  and  Portugal 
and  Spain  (1986)  have  increased  regional  inequality.  The  objective of 
aiding  regions  which  have  fallen  significantly behind  in  terms  of structure 
to  catch  up  is the  real  crux  when  it comes  to economic  and  social  cohesion, 
as  the  Community  is nowadays  more  heterogeneous  and  therefore  more 
vulnerable  than  before.  Two  figures  are  sufficient to  indicate the extent 
of  this  change:  before  Spain  and  Portugal  joined, one  European  in eight 
had  an  annual  income  30%  below  the  Community  average,  while  the  figure  in 
1986  was  one  in  five,  although  the  average  of  1986  (average  of  12 
countries>  is  lower  than  it would  have  been  if the old average,  without 
Spain  and  Portugal,  had  been  taken.  The  magnitude  of  the  problem  in 
financial  terms,  of  reducing  inequality,  can  be  illustrated by  the 
following  rough  example.  The  average  GOP/head  of the  Community  in 1987  is 
estimated at  11.148  ECUS,  that  of  Greece  being  3.920  ECUS.  Taking  into 
account  Greece's  population of  10M,  the  gap  that  has  to be  bridged  is about 
72  billion  ECUS!  <The  gap  being  calculated as:  difference of  EC-average 
GOP/head  and  Greece's  GOP/head  multiplied by  Greece's  population>. 
Compared  to this gap,  the  EROF  received  3.098  Mio  ECUS  in  1986  (about  8,5% 
of  the  Community's  budget).  Of  course,  the  above  is only  a  very  rough 
estimate that  should  serve  to  indicate the  impossibility of  bringing about 
economic  convergence  only  through  financial  transfers.  Financial 
transfers, if used  well,  could  contribute to growth  rates  and  so  help to 
bridge  the  gap,  but  other  factors  have  an  even  higher  incidence  on  growth 
rates.  Such  factors  are  general  economic  policy measures  and  their 
influence  on  the  framework  in  which  the  economy  operates,  as  well  as  their 
influence  on  the  "economic  climat~'(for example  the  formation  of 
expectations>,  the  situation  in  the  labour  and  capital  markets  (the  legal 
framework  for  the  regulation of the  capital  and-the  labour  market,  the 
bargaining  process,  the  Labour  market  etc),  social attitudes, political 
stability or  instability, natural  resources,  technology  level  and  transfers 
etc.  It  must  also  be  underlined,  that  EROF  interventions  (and  also 
national  regional  development  aid)  do  have  multiplier  and  linkage effects, 
- 23  -so  that  an  initial  investment  realises,over its entire time  horizo~a 
multiple  value  in  income  and  growth  generated of  the  amount  originally 
invested. 
Some  problems  are  related to  regional  policy.  First  there  is 
considerable  disagreement  among  economists  as  to  whether  regional 
incentives  are  or  can  be  effective  in  bringing  about  a  narrowing  of the  gap 
between  rich  and  poor  regions.  The  reasons  for  divergences  in  economic 
performance  between  countries  and  between  regions  are often very 
deep-seated  and  not  necessarily  amenable  to treatment  by  a  larger  regional 
policy  budget.  Although  a  poor  infrastructure,  lack  of  natural  resources 
or  a  peripheral  Location  can  adversely affect  a  region's  economy,  these are 
not  necessarily the  most  important  factors  in  determining  its performance. 
Cultural traditions,  education  and  training  can  be  at  Least  as vital and 
yet  are  frequently  less susceptible  to  treatment  by  government 
policy-makers. 
These  considerations  do  not  free  the  Community  from  its duty  to try to 
promote  economic  development  in  its  less  favoured  regions.  Unfortunately, 
Regional  Policy at  Community  Level,  as  it is at  the  moment  faces  a  serious 
problem  concerning  the  creation of  new  economic  activities  in  the  Less 
favoured  regions.  These  regions  are  to be  found  in  countries  where  public 
finance  must  face  severe  restrictions  in  future  years.  In  these  countries, 
public  finance  is insufficient to give  either  real  incentives to private 
investment  or  realise the  large-scale  public  investment  which  is necessary 
to  the  modernisation  of  the  economies.  So  it would  seem  desirable that  the 
ERDF  undertakes  100%  of  all expenditure  for  regional  development  in the 
least  favoured  areas  of  the  Community.  At  present,  a  major  increase  in 
the  EC  funds  available  for  regional  spending  in  the  poorer  Member  States 
would  put  great  pressure  on  the  rule  which  requires  the  Member  State itself 
to  put  up  at  least  half  of  the  public  finance  for  a  particular project. 
This  rule  has  already been  relaxed  for  Portugal  which  only  has  to find  30% 
in  view  of  the  extremely  perilous  state of  its public  finances.  This  Lack 
of  national  resources  to  fund  infrastructure and  other  regional  projects 
could  of  course  be  relieved  by  a  'budget  equalisation  scheme'  such  as  that 
also  referred to  in  the  MacDougall 11  conclusions,  but  direct  Community 
- 24  -funding  of  the  whole  cost  of  some  infrastructure  spending  and  all  regional 
incentives  for  industry  and  services  could  be  simpler  for  this and  some 
other  Member  States.12 
So,  although  regional  aid  should  be  regarded  as  positive  in  reducing 
inequality,  its importance  is  secondary  compared  to growth  enhancing 
economic  policy.  Further,  the  amounts  needed  to make  a  real  impact  in the 
reduction  of  inequality  in the  EC  would  require  not  a  doubling  of  the 
Structural  Funds  (as  envisaged  by  the  Commission)  but  a  multiple of  the 
amounts  actually available,  although  the  doubling  is a  step  in the  right 
direction. 
In  addition to the  increase of  financial  resources  for  the  funds,  which  for 
the  time  being  is not  yet  assured,  the  Commission  proposes  some  reforms  to 
ameliorate  the  impact  of  the  Structural  Funds  and  the  ERDF  in particular. 
1.  The  Community's  budget  funds  must  be  concentrated  in  the  least  favoured 
regions,  i.e. all of  Portugal,  Ireland and  Greece,  some  parts of  Spain, 
the  South  of  Italy,  Northern  Ireland,  and  the  French  overseas 
departments. 
2.  It is programmes  which  will  constitute the  central  plank:  the aim  is to 
make  sure  that  the  Community's  support  for  the  Member  States'  efforts 
and  initiatives is  located at  the  right  Level.  As  opposed  to action 
through  projects,  programmes  will  combine  the  following  advantages: 
(i)  they will  associate effectively the  specific  intervention operations 
conducted  by  the  various  subsidy  and  loan  facilities,  each  having 
its own  responsibility and  experience  as  regards  regional 
development,  employment  policy  and  agricultural  techniques; 
(ii)  they  will  lead  to decentralisation of  Community  action by  giving 
maximum  scope  for  Local  or  regional  initiatives, which  are  the  most 
effective for  investment  and  employment.  Programmes  will  involve 
contracts  between  the  Community,  the  Member  States  and  the  regions. 
They  will  involve  joint preparation,  monitoring  and  assesment,  and 
they  will  thus  lead  to a  fully-fledged  partnership. 
- 25  -The  European  Parliament  broadly  supported the  Commission  suggestions  on 
this  subject  as  presented  in its proposal  for  a  Regulation  the tasks of  the 
structural  Funds  and  their effectiveness  and  on  coordination of  their 
activities between  themselves  and  with  the operation of  the  European 
Investment  Bank  and  the other  financial  instruments.  Subject  to a  large 
number  of  minor  amendments  it approved  this document  in its resolution of 
19.11.1987  in the  Gomes  Report13. 
Further  to the  Commission's  proposals,  it is necessary to have  clear 
priorities for  the  interventions of  the  ERDF  which  could  be  made  according 
to the  following  criteria: 
(1)  The  quota  system  could  be  continued  in future  for  the  classic 
interventions of  the  ERDF,  as  for  example  the  creation of  new 
infrastructures,  taking  into account  a  parallel  redistribution of  the 
quota  system  according  to the  criterion of  regional decentralisation. 
(2)  The  financing  of  new  types  of  intervention according to the  regional 
needs  and  the possibilities  (or  not)  of  the national  economy  to support 
it.  Such  interventions  could  be  financed  by  the  special  lines of  the 
Community's  budget. 
7.  Social Policy 
According  to the  Commission's  proposals, one  side of  the  ESF's  activities 
will  follow  regional eligibility rules  and  the  second  will  be  of  horizontal 
nature,  combatting  long-term  unemployment  and  integration  into employment 
of  young  people.  Community  action will  take place  in the  framework  of 
programmes. 
A number  of  problems  still remain,  however.  The  structure and  the  rules 
of  the  ESF  are  adapted  to the  labour  markets  of  the  more  industrialised 
Member  States  and  do  not  take  sufficient account  of  the particularities of 
the  less-developped  regions,  so  that  the  structural  character of this  Fund 
is diluted.  It is characteristic that  the  same  criteria apply  to all 
Community's  regions,  independently  from  these being  developped  or 
underdevelopped.  The  EST  should  be  reformed  in-order to take  into account 
the  particularities of  underdevelopped  regions  (Like  under-employment  and 
- 26  -low  mobility of  labour).  Its field of  intervention should  be  enlarged, 
and  be  specified taking  into account  the·needs of  the  less-developped 
regions.  The  following  proposals  go  into this direction: 
(1)  Adaptation  of  a  special  reg~Lation for  areas of  absolute priority, 
(2)  Increase of  the  percentages  Cup  to  75%  for  example)  for  interventions 
of  the  ESF  in these  areas, 
(3)  Greater  regional  concentration of  the  ESF  interventions,  with  an 
increase  of  the  quota  for  less-developped  regions, 
(4)  Setting  up  of  a  system  of  centres  for  technical  and  professional 
education, 
(5)  Adaptation  of  pilot-programmes  by  the  Community,  on  which  priority will 
be  given  to the  professional  and  social  re-absorption of  workers  that 
move  into other  regions, 
(6)  The  possibility of  introducing  a  national  quota  system  for  the 
distribution of  the  ESF's  resources  could  be  examined.  In  this 
system,  the  less-developped  countries would  benefit  from  the  incr~ased 
quotas. 
8.  The  EMS 
As  stressed above,  appropriate  economic  policies are  more  important  in 
order  to  increase economic  and  social  cohesion  than  just the transfer of 
financial  resources.  In  this  respect  the  EMS  has  had  some  favourable 
results  which  will  be  continued  in  future.  The  EMS  is vital to the 
implementation  of  a  cooperative strategy  becau~e the  relative stability of 
exchange  rates  provide  participants with  a  guarantee  that  the efforts they 
undertake  in pursuit  of  moderni.sation  and  competitiveness  will  not  be 
undermined  by  aggressive  exchange  rate  policies. and  because  effective use 
of  EC  instruments-for medium-term  balance  of  payments  support  facilitates 
implementation  of  the  most  difficult cyclical  adjus~ments.  Monetary. 
stability is capital  for  the  formation  of  stable expectations  whose 
importance  for  the  good  function~ng of. the  economy  has  been  widely 
accepted. 
- 27  -The  EMS  has  resulted  in·  a  greater coordination of  economic  and  monetary 
policies  for  the  Member  States participating in the exchange  rate 
mechanism.  Since  the exchange  rate becomes  a  monetary  target  per  se, 
coordination of  monetary  and  economic  policy becomes  a  necessity.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  some  instances,  the  Member  States  have  chosen  the easier  way 
of devaluation,  instead of  a  change  in-economic  policy,  but  this phase 
seems  to  be  at  an  end.  Further,  the  EMS  offers the  advantage  of  sharing 
the burden  of adjustment  with  the partners  in  cases of  realignment  of 
exchange  rates,  since the  new  exchange  rates  come  about  by  common 
agreement. 
It would  be  an  advantage  for  the  Member  States that  do  not  participate in 
the  exchange  rate mechanism  of  the  EMS  (UK,  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal)  to 
participate  in the  near  future.  On  the other  hand,  participation would 
help  some  of  these  countries  in  reducing  their above-average  rates of 
inflation.14  The  EMS  has  broHght  about  more  anti-inflationary economic 
policies  than  would  have  been  the  case  in its absence  for  some  Member 
States  and  this  has  contributed positively to growth;  gains  that  cannot  be 
measured,  because  there is  no  methodology  that  permits  a  separation of 
growth  rates directly attributed to better economic  policy due  to the 
EMs.15 
Monetary  unification  remains  one  of  the  Community's  aims.  On  theoretic 
considerations it is expected  that this will  contribute positively to 
growth  but  may  under  some  aspects  increase  inequality by  having  negative 
effects on  the  less developed  regions.  (for  example  increased  capital 
outflow  from  these  regions  under  unification,  where  transaction  costs will 
be  lower  or non-existent,  due  to better  investment  opportunities  in the 
more  developed  regions>16•  Still, complete  monetary  unification for  the 
Community  lies in the distant  future. 
The  Single  Act  does  not  go  very  far  concerning  monetary  and  economic  union. 
It is stated  (Article  20)  that  Member  States  cooperate  in the  field of 
economic  and  monetary  policy,  in order to guarantee  the  Community's  further 
development.  It  is not  stated, on  the other  hand,  what  form  this 
cooperation  should  take  and  what  instruments  should  be  used,  with  the 
- 28  -exception of  mentioning  the  experience  gained  under  the  EMS.  Indirectly 
the  EMS  is  recognised  as  a  prerequisite for  rapid  economic  growth  in the 
Community  and  consequently  a  major  force  for  cohesion. 
It will  be  an  advantage  for  their economies  for  the  Member  States  whose 
currencies  do  not  participate  in  the  exchange  rate arrangement  of the  EMS, 
to do  so  in  the  near  future.  This  could  bring  about  a  more  disciplined 
monetary  policy,  from  which  their economies  would  benefit. 
The  EMS  can  be  strengthened  in the  following  ways: 
<1>  Through  more  effective  coordination of  interest  rate policies,  which 
has  been  conspicuously  absent  recently, 
(2)  The  divergence  indicator  could  become  a  positive trigger for 
coordinated  and  balanced  intervention by  the  central  banks, 
(3)  Through  increased use  of  the  ECU  and  a  wider  regulating  role  for  the 
European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund, 
(4)  To  make  the  ECU  a  reserve  currency and  a  means  of  payment, 
(5)  By  the  complete  liberalisation of  capital movements, 
(6)  By  completing  the  EMS  through  the  introduction of  a  common  policy 
towards  third currencies,  in particular the dollar and  the yen. 
The  last  point  is very  important,  because  actually tensions  in the 
international  monetary  scene,  e.g.  the devaluations  of  the dollar,  create 
tensions  inside  the  EMS  that  are often  leading  to  realignments  of  central 
rates,  as  recently.  This  occurs  because  some  EMS  currencies  like  the  DM, 
are  much  closer substitutes to the dollar  than  others,  so  that  capital 
outflow  from  the dollar goes  mainly  to the  DM,  putting it under  pressure  to 
appreciate  also towards  the other  EMS  currencies17• 
9.  The  internal •arket 
The  Community's  first  concern  during  the  period  up  to 1992  must  be  to  keep 
up  the  momentum  created at  the  end  of  1986  so  that  work  on  completion  of 
the  internal  market  can  proceed  in accordance  with  the  programme  set out  in 
the  Commission's  White  Paper.  Attainment  of  this objective  is a 
prerequisite  for  an  efficient, modern  Europe  that  will  provide  industry and 
- 29  -commerce  with  a  structural  framework  in which  they  can  be  fully 
competitive.  Each  institution has  an  important  role  to play  in this 
process.  The  Council  has  been  given  the  means  of  speeding  up 
decision-making  while  the  new  cooperation procedure  gives  Parliament  a  far 
wider  role  than  in the  past  in this area. 
As  with  monetary  unification, the  completion  of the  internal  market  could 
also  have  a  negative  impact  on  less developed  regions  of  the  Community, 
permitting  as  it does  increased  competition  and  bringing  about  possibly an 
outflow  of  resources.  Competition,  leading  to more  efficient production, 
creates  in the  end  overall  growth  and  is positive  from  the  Community's 
point  of  view  but  may  have  a  negative  transitory effect  on  inequality. 
This  is  why  some  counter-availing measures,  possibly of  a  temporary  nature, 
may  have  to be  introduced.  Such  measures  could  be  introduced  by  giving 
aid to the  Less-developed  Member  States  for  them  to ameliorate their 
infrastructure  in the  fields of  norms  and  metrology,  packaging  and  quality 
control.  The  Community  could  further  introduce  a  strategy also  in the 
sector of  certification of quality, origin etc.  This  strategy could  have 
the  following  main  characteristics: 
(1)  The  co-financing  and  the granting of  technical  aid to the  less 
developed  Member  States  so  that  they  can  set  up  test  laboratories  in 
their main  sectors of  production, 
(2)  The  imposition of  a  common  European  quality standard  <or  signs)  that 
will  be  given  (to the  various· products)  by  recognised  national 
organisations, 
(3)  The  creation of  an  independent  Community  organ  for  the  mutual 
recognition of  laboratory tests, quality signs  and  control  and 
certification organisations  in  the  Member  States. 
Definite  progress  must  be  made  in  the  following  areas  in order to  realise 
the objective of  an  Internal  Market  by  1992  as  laid down  in  the  Single  Act: 
- 30  -(1)  Public  contracts must  be  open  to producers  of all Member  States, 
(2)  Indirect  taxation  must  be  harmonised  and  approximated, 
(3)  Progress  on  standardisation must  be  continued, 
(4)  The  financial  dimension  of  the  internal  market  must  be  completed. 
Capital  movements  must  be  liberalised.  This  move  towards  the 
inter-linking of  financial  markets  will  afford much  wider  opportunities 
for  the  circulation of  securities, the development  of  collective forms 
of  investment,  access  for  borrowers  to the  capital markets  of  other 
Member  States,  and  the  quotation  of  securities on  other  stock 
exchanges. 
10.  Transport  Policy 
Complete  freedom  of  movement  of  goods  and  persons  can  make  full  economic 
sense,  only if transport  policy  makes  substantial  progress  towards  a 
genuinely  competitive  system  enabling unit  costs to be  reduced 
significantly;  travel  within  Europe  must  be  made  easier,  while  maintaining 
high  quality and  safety standards  and  adequate  welfare  rules.  Action  in 
the  area  of  competition  will  not  in itself offset  handicaps  affecting  some 
areas  and  regions,  either because  they  are far  from  communication  routes  or 
because  they are  congested  by  excessive traffic.  Thus,  transport  policy 
has  also  a  regional  dimension. 
Certain  infrastructures must  be  created,  the  financing  of  which  must  in 
part  be  undertaken  by  the  Community  (EIB,  ERDF  and  IMP)  and  in part  by 
greater mobilisation of private money. 
So,  transport  policy must  move  along  the  following  main  lines: 
(1)  More  competition, 
<2)  More  deregulation, 
(3)  Amelioration  of  infrastructure  for  less developed  regions.  Financial 
engineering  techniques  should  be  used  from  1987  onwards  to create 
conditions  favourable  to the  planning  and  realisation of  major  projects 
(such  as  the  Channel  Tunnel)  and  to mobilise  the  market  for  new  forms 
of  Community  funding  (budget  guarantees  and  project  financing). 
- 31  -11.  Research  and  Technological  Develop•ent 
The  Single  Act  provides  a  legal  basis  for  giving  a  new  impetus  to the 
Community's  scientific and  technological  base. 
Research  and  technological  development  is a  decisive  area  for  the  creation 
of  a  large, modern  and  competitive  market,  an  area  in  which  it is becoming 
increasingly clear that  the  Community  has  a  specific and  indispensable 
role  to play.  Unfortunately,  the  actual  situation  in the  Community  is 
not  very  good.  There  is a  great  dispartiy in  GOP  expenditure  for 
research  between  the  Community  and  the  US  and  Japan.  In  1981  the  US  gave 
2,5%  and  Japan  2,3%  of their  respective GOP's  for  research,  compared  to 
the  Community's  average  of only  1,4%.  Another  disadvantage  of  Community 
research  spending,  is that  since most  of it is undertaken  at  the national 
level,  duplication of effort is unavoidable. 
Inside the  Community  a  great  disparity of  R and  D spending  can  be 
observed.  In  1981  Germany  spent  253,6,  France  198,3 and  the  UK  203  US 
Dollars  per  head  for  R and  D,  (compared  to 320,6  in the  US  and  217,4  in 
Japan)  while  Greece  only  10,5, Portugal  15,8,  Spain  24,1  and  Ireland 45,1. 
In  percentages  of  GDP,  the  situation is as  follows:  Community  average 
1,4, Germany,  1,8,  France  1,5,  UK  1,9, Greece  0,2,  Spain  0,4,  Portugal 
0,5,  Ireland 0,7.  Community  spending  reached  only  0,97%  of  the  sum  of 
.  l  d.  18  nat1ona  spen  1ng  • 
The  Community  would  be  the  ideal  instrument  to bridge  the  inequality on  R 
and  D spending  of  the  Member  States.  This  inequality  results  in  further 
future  inequality,  since  R and  D is very  important  for  growth. 
(According  to economic  estimates  more  than  50%  of  yearly growth  in  the 
developed  economies  is due  to technical  progress,  i.e.  research  and 
development  that  is  implemented  in  innovations).  Inequality  in  R and  D 
spending  is thus  a  source  for  the  perpetuation of  GDP  and  incomes 
inequality  in the  Community.  R and  D has  a  dual  character,  being  both  a 
result  <Low  GOP  leads  to  low  R and  D spending)  and  a  cause  of  inequality 
(Low  R and  D today  leads  to  lower  GOP  in  the  future.) 
- 32  -R and  D should  be  undertaken  more  and  more  at  the  Community  level  in 
future,  because  the  Community  offers the  following  advantages  in this 
sector: 
(1)  R and  D activity among  Member  States  can  be  coordinated  through  the 
Community, 
<2>  Duplication of  effort  can  be  avoided 
(3)  Economies  of  scale exist  in this field to a  high  extent,  since this  R 
and  D is very  capital  intensive, 
(4)  A Long-term  strategy  could  be  developed  at  the  Community  level  that 
promises  success,  (such  a  successful  strategy was  developped  by  Japan  in 
the  past). 
The  Community•s  framework  programme  aims  at 
<1>  the  reinforcement  of  the  industrial  competitiveness  of  the  Member 
States,  and 
(2)  the  reinforcement  of  cohesion,  through  the participation of 
less-developped  Member  States  and  small  and  medium  sized enterprises 
to the  programmes. 
Conditions  for  the  implementation  of a  successful  R and  D strategy for 
Europe  are: 
<1>  The  substantial  increase of  resources  devoted  to it at  the  Community 
and  the national  level, 
<2>  The  financing  of the  programmes  of  the  Less-developped  Member  States 
with  a  higher  than  average  percentage  (even  above  SOX  of  the total 
cost  of  a  programme>, 
(3)  The  financing  by  the  ERDF  of  a  programme  of  research  infrastructure, 
(4)  The  support  of  the  flow  of  information  and  transfer of  technology  to 
the  less-developped  Member  States. 
- 33  -12.  Financial  resources 
This  is one  of  the  problem  areas of  the  Community  since it is  common 
knowledge  that  the  own  resources  base  is being  eroded  because  the  various 
components  are  growing  less  rapidly than  economic  activity.19  What  the 
Community  needs  today  is budgetary  security and  this  can  be  achieved  by 
making  two  major  changes  to its financial  resources: 
(1)  The  first  is to define  the new  ceiling on  resources  by  reference  to 
Community  GNP.  This  is a  better  reflection of the  Community's 
prosperity and  financial  strength than  VAT.  The  new  ceiling can  be 
fixed,  according  to the  Commission's  proposal  to  1.4%  of  GNP  for  1992, 
(2)  The  second  change  is to alter the make-up  of  resources  within this 
ceiling,  not  only  to achieve  a  better match  between  each  country's 
budget  contribution and  its relative prosperity but  also to provide  a 
measure  of  flexibility. 
According  to the  Commission's  proposals  the  resources  available  within  the 
limit  of  1.4%  of  GNP,  would  be  as  follows:  Customs  duties,  agricultural 
levies  and  revenue  from  VAT,  representing  1%  of the  base  actually subject 
to  VAT.  To  these three traditional sources,  a  fourth  'new  balancing' 
resource,  must  be  added,  according  to the  Commission's  proposals.  This 
will  be  calculated on  an  additional  base,  defined as  the difference 
between  GNP  and  the  actual  VAT  base  used  for  the  1%  levy.  The  Commission 
wants  to  keep  a  fifth option open.  This  resource  could  be  added  between 
now  and  1992  but  without  exceeding  the  1.4%  ceiling.  One  possibility 
might  be  a  minimal  stamp  duty  on  financial  transactions.  It must  be 
underligned  that  with  the  proposed  ceiling corresponding  to 1.4%  of  GNP 
the  growth  of  own  resources  will  not  be  higher  than  in the  years  1980  to 
1987.  In  fact  it will  be  lower  if one  allows  for  the fact  that  existing 
liabilities will  have  to  be  absorbed  within that  ceiling20• 
The  principal  change  in  the  system  proposed  by  the  Commission  is the 
introduction of  the additional  base,  which  would  seem  to  introduce  an 
element  of  progressivity because  the  burden  falling on  each  Member  State 
would  be  related to its GNP.  Nevertheless,  the call-in rate applied to 
the  additional  base  would  be  determined  by  the  size of  the gap  between 
resources  obtained  from  traditional  sources  and  the  Community's 
- 34  -expenditure  requirements  for  any  one  year  or  the other.  The  additional 
base  resource  does  not  therefore establish a  direct  correlation between  a 
Member  State's payment  and  its relative wealth21 • 
There  have  been  in  the  past  other  proposals  for  new  own  resources  of  the 
Community,  like  those  in  the  MacDougall  Report  which  are still worth 
examining. 
The  MacDougall  report  Looks  at  a  number  of possible  new  own  resources. 
The  report  notes  that  if VAT  in each  Member  State were  composed  of  two 
parts,  a  national  rate and  a  Community  rate as  a  'piggy-back'  rate added 
to  the  national  rate, there  would  be  a  much  more  direct  Link  between  the 
Community  and  the  taxpayer.  Increases  or decreases  in  the  Community  rate 
would  have  a  direct  affect  on  the  tax  and  prices  paid  by  consumers.  Such 
an  arrangement  would  also  provide  the  Community  with  its own  fiscal 
instrument  for  a  counter-cyclical  tax  policy. 
A Community  'piggy-back'  VAT  would  have  to be  married  with  an  extension of 
the  Community's  budget  powers.  Surpluses or deficits arising  from 
counter-cyclical  tax policies would  be  financed  by  borrowing  or  saving 
operations. 
Other  Community  income  sources  considered  by  the  MacDougall  report  are  -
- A Community  corporation tax  which  would  have  the effect  of taxing, 
automatically,  the  enterprises which  profit most  from  the  integration of 
the  Common  Market.  This  would  be  on  the  basis  of  a  tax-sharing 
arrangement  with  the  Member  States, 
- For  regional  policy the  report  points  out  that  disincentives  by  way  of 
the  taxation of  economic  activities in  congested  areas  could  be  used  to 
finance  incentives  for  the  development  of  activity  in  Less  developed 
regions.  The  'push  and  pull'  effect  would  result  in  limiting the 
budgetary  expenditure  required to strengthen  convergence. 
- MacDougall  also  refers to  contributions  for  directly financing  the 
budget  based  on  Member  States  fiscal  capacity or  national  accounts. 
This  closely  resembles  the  Commission's  proposal  for  an  'additional 
base'. 
- 35  -In  short  the  Commission's  proposals  are  for  the  removal  of  anomalies  (e.g. 
the  exclusion of  ECSC  levy  from  traditional  own  resources>;  a 
redefinition of  the  VAT  base;  and  in the  interim the  creation of  a 
residual  revenue  source  based  on  a  formula  which  includes  national  GNP  as 
a  variable.  The  MacDougall  report's proposals  are  wider  ranging  and  are 
also aimed  at  strengthening macro-economic  management  at  Community  level. 
13. S•all and  •edium-sized undertakings 
Faced  with  the  challenge of  making  firms  more  competitive  and  developing 
Europe's  technological  potential, it is vital that  the  Community  should  do 
more  to  help  business,  particularly small  ones,  with  an  eye  to  completion 
of the  internal  market.  Further,  SMU's  are  very  important  especially in 
under-developped  regions,  where  very  often big enterprises are totally 
absent.  SMU  policy  has  thus  also  regional  aspects.  A successful  SMU 
policy  can  bring  about  increased growth  in  less-developped  regions  and  so 
increase  economic  and  social  cohesion. 
The  main  objectives of  a  Community  programme  for  SMU's  should  be: 
<1>  The  reorientation of  SMU's  to  new  products,  specialisation and  the 
introduction of  new  technology  and  organisation also for  traditional 
products, 
(2)  The  amelioration of organisation of  methods  of economic  and  financial 
management  and  of  the  level  of education  and  training of their staff, 
(3)  The  support  of  cooperation  among  SMU's  in order to achieve  economies 
of  scale  in  many  areas  (common  orders  for  raw  materials,  production 
cooperatives,  common  advertising and  selling,  common  services etc.) 
These  aims  could  be  achieved  through  an  integrated programme  having  the 
following  points: 
(1)  Greater  development  of organisations giving technical  aid and  services 
to  SMU's, 
<2>  A system  of diffusion of  information  in  technology  and  knowledge  for 
SMU's, 
- 36  -(3)  Supporting  the development  and  application of  operational  programming 
inside  SMU's, 
(4)  Operating  of  incentives  for  the  creation of  common  services for  SMU's, 
(5)  Modernisation  of  economic  and  financial  management  of  SMU's  with  the 
help  of  informatisation, 
(6)  Creation  and  development  of  'modernisation  centres'  that  would  diffuse 
new  technologies  and  knowledge,  i.e.  through  the operation of  model 
plants.  They  could  at  the  same  time  diffuse also  information  from 
and  to  SMU's, 
(7)  Training  of  the staff of  SMU's. 
- 37  -STATISTICAL  ANNEX 
- 39  -Table  1 
· lnlrttn~llon dl'n:b on lM % trmd ~~:rowtb rat~ or tM,.r  countrifs 
. f£0 \961·12. 
--...:=.~=:-:::--=-....=:::::.....-==--::~ 
~~~~~~  ~~  ~r~~  -- -- ---
Germany  France  Italy  Netherlands  Rclgium-l.ux. 
---- ---- ------------ ---- - ---- ------- ------.---
Actual  ~trotrlb rare  4.39  5.40  4.97  5.11  4.56 
1 • Growth rote due to EEC 
-0.02  -2.71  1.04  2.94  2.45 
(I= -2-l + 4 +S + 6 + 7 + 81 
Which was made up of 
2-Tenns of trade changes  0.02  0.57  0.94  0.19  ·0.17 
3-Change in propensity to 1mport  2.25  2.90  1.12  0.44  1.16 
4-Grotrlb of nport volume  3.52  1.25  4.74  4.09  4.56 
5-Change in the trade balance posihon  -0.45  -2.08  0.05  -0.06  -0.71 
6-Nct EF.C bud&ct  paymenll  -0.14  0.01  -0.28  0.12  0.09 
7-forri&n invnrment  -1.02  -0.05  -1.13  -0.15  -0.07 
8-Re,.dual  +  erro~ 
0.34  1.64  -0.28  -0.43  -0.43 
(8o(J+2+J)(4+5+6+7)1 
Notes: As defined 1n  the modd a negative sign of the tenm of trade meanll an improvement; 
-The total c:ffa:t may dtrfer from the sum of its oomponents due to roundtng. 
Source:  A.  J.  Marques  Mendes,  "Economic 
Growth  in  Europe",  Croom  Helm, 
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B. Gross domestic product at market prices (N1) 
8.4 Per head of total population 
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At current pric• and current exchange rat•  - Aux prix et taux de change courant. 
ECU 
1011  1 st7  2 381  2 647  2t21  3 338  3 774  4 225  4 839  5 388  5 942  1870  1485  8180  8 901  9519  10178 
1 21!i  1 831  2 978  3 359 
1 245  1 877  2 715  2 949 
700  1126  1 834  1 959 
908  1 424  2 513  2 829 
1157  1 642  2 562  2 809 
1 574  1 979  3 170  3 212 
1303  1 723 
591  873 
399  655 
2165 
1289 
3139 
1109 
2405 
1452 
3408 
1190 
3734 
3354 
2111 
3215 
3 225 
3686 
2 535 
1648 
3876 
1263 
4617 
3910 
2 287 
3821 
3770 
4576 
2606 
1 760 
4641 
1467 
680  1 066  1177  1 382  1 656 
277'  403'  707"  786'  893'  1 092' 
2647  3314  4720  4936  5016  5045 
870  1 928  2119  2 548  3108 
5146 
4260 
2589 
4607 
4 538 
5692 
2 923 
1 876 
5 287 
1 759 
6 447 
5181 
2 794 
5137 
5088 
5284 
3359 
2131 
6000 
1 858 
2109  2381 
1 297"  1 340' 
5 579  5 755 
3 609  3618 
6476  7 368 
5 934.  6 326 
3024  3 376 
6190  7086 
6076  6916 
6403  6925 
3612 
2319 
7 324 
2 201 
2693 
1 520' 
7013 
4461 
3955 
2666 
8007 
2463 
2906 
1 559 
7588 
5333 
8199 
6989 
3666 
7 737 
7573 
7 709 
4491 
3071 
8691 
2633 
3134 
1520 
7565 
6663 
9037 
7 816 
4 216 
8191 
8056 
8368 
5392 
3511 
9404 
2 947 
3848 
1590 
1741 
6365 
9617 
8 758 
5049 
8623 
8591 
8985 
9931  10911  ,  981  12 749 
9605  10181  10619  11328 
5 627  6 275  7 025  7 774 
8 925  9 860  . 10 383  10 835 
8 725  8 757  9159  9 784 
9394  9607  10505  11743 
6808  8113  8739  9054  9541 
4 072  4 769  5 521  5 836  6 345 
9321  10049  11178  12385  13587 
2 991  3414  3983  3986  4309 
4074 
1927 
4478  4860  4667 
2277 
5332 
8 222  11  426  13 378  15 689  19 456 
6529  8918  9349  11116  13203' 
At 1980 pric• and 1980 exchange rat•  - Aux prix at taux de change de1980 
4033  4858 
5140  6243 
4 206  5 215 
2394  2 978 
4575  5418 
4192  5164 
5 560  6 303 
5866 
7 399 
6506 
3901 
7027 
6411 
7 274 
8017 
7 535 
6794 
3940 
7 234 
6624 
7 427 
4596  5178  5715  5839 
2 955  3 029 
7 765  7 917 
1049  1 504  2071  2 208 
8228 
7803 
7132 
4037 
7 397 
6946 
7 823 
8551 
8129 
7 455 
4291 
7681 
7334 
8415 
5 955  6 394 
3177  3274 
8287  8536 
2 389  2 552 
8 625 
8140 
7 646 
4440 
7 924 
7 612 
8649 
6 331 
3 357 
8418 
2 450 
8 641 
8040 
7 625 
4255 
7849 
7 478 
8065 
6 289 
3488 
8338 
2 574 
ECU 
8857 
8516 
7 971 
4483 
8183 
7858 
8 215 
6 528 
3481 
8855 
2 702 
8998 
8 787 
8159 
4560 
8323 
7882 
8360 
7213 
9050 
8468 
4656 
8476 
8111 
8644 
6 598  6 837 
3 716  3 933 
8972  9076 
2 752  2899 
7440 
9420 
8 711 
4870 
8618 
8 271 
8890 
6981 
3989 
9374 
2 969 
7485 
9511 
8758 
5049 
8623 
8591 
8985 
6808 
4072 
9 321 
2991 
7448 
9 514 
8749 
5050 
8603 
8456 
8837 
6705 
4125 
9240 
2 955 
7471 
9460 
8858 
5012 
8345 
8582 
8902 
6811 
4111 
9 511 
2931 
7550 
9607 
8882 
4974 
8392 
8572 
9139 
7895 
9894 
8964 
5086 
8489 
8696 
9584 
7036  7146 
4079  4 227 
9719  10098 
2 923  2982 
£UR10 
D 
NL 
B 
UK 
IR 
OK 
GR 
ESP 
POR 
USA 
JAP 
EUR 10 
0 
NL 
B 
UK 
IR 
OK 
GR 
2435  3118  3243  3476  3715  3890  3897  3962  4044  4071  4042  4074  4060  4052  4134  4200  ESP 
716' 
5311 
~·  I 317"  I 4011' 
ll217  6841  6966 
2 938  4 685  4 820 
1 ~n· 
7 260 
!1124 
1689' 
7 699 
6431 
I U/8' 
1411) 
5 293 
1 t.~··· 
7 33b 
5:162 
1813'  1 7011' 
7007  7946 
5 659  6 796 
1 764' 
81:13 
6037 
,  .. .,.,. 
8 :n7 
6 574 
1U4' 
8 416 
6 721 
8® 
11871 
Source:  EUROSTAT,  National  Account  Aggregates,  1960-1984 
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the  Role  of  Public  Finance  in  European  Integration",  was  published  by  the 
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13Report  for  the  Committee  on  Regional  Policy  Doc.  A2-205/87  of 8.11.87. 
14  For  an  extensive presentation of the  arguments  for  and  against  fixed 
exchange  rates,  economic  and  monetary  independence  and  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  the  EMS,  see  N.  Kyriazis  "The  drachma's  adhesion  to the  EMS: 
possible effects"  in  "Kredit  und  Kapital",  Heft  4,  1985  and  N.  Kyriazis  "The 
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15  N.  Kyriazis,  N.  Chryssanthou,  "US-EC  Monetary  Relations",  Research  and 
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1986,  and  papers  cited therein. 
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international  monetary  order  through  a  tripolar  Dollar-EEC-Yen  arrangement, 
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